The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity

7. A civil compact or commonwealth, governed wisely by just and wholesome laws, could not possibly be exhibited to men, except by some intelligent being approving of this order ; and as devils and wicked men generally hate and oppose this order, it must of necessity be God who has hitherto preserved it. “ By me kings reign and princes decree justice.” (Prov. 8:15.)

8. Heroic enthusiasm, or that wisdom and excellent virtue in under taking and accomplishing works surpassing the ordinary powers of man, as the dexterity and delight of skillful artificers and of governors in discovering and furthering the arts, and in devising various counsel ; also such greatness of mind in performing deeds of renown, and in managing affairs, as there was in Achilles, Alexander, Archimedes, Plato, &c., all give evidence that there must be some superior and omnipotent cause that excites and urges men on to these things. Of Joshua it is said : “ The Lord him self will go before thee, he will be with thee.” “ The Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus.” “ The Spirit of the Lord came upon him.” (Deut. 31:8. Ezra 1:1. Jud. 14:19.)

9. The prediction of future events which could have been foreknown neither by human sagacity, nor by natural causes or signs, as the prophecies which had respect to the deluge, to the posterity of Abraham, the coming of the Messiah, &c., are of necessity known only by being revealed by him who has both men and the nature of things so completely in his power, that without his will nothing can be done. He is truly God, who can thus foretell what is to come to pass. “ Shew the things that are to come here after, that we may know that ye are gods.” (Is. 41 : 23.)

10. The end and use of things generally are not by mere chance, nor from a being destitute of reason, but proceed from a cause that is wise and omnipotent, which is God. All things now are wisely adapted and ordained to their own peculiar and certain ends.

11. The order of cause and effect is finite, nor can it come to pass that the chain or course of efficient causes can be of infinite extent. There must, therefore, be some first cause which either mediately or immediately produces and moves the rest, and on which all other causes depend ; for in every order that is finite there is something that is first and before every thing else.