Happily, the possible world approach doesn't suggest that there was a reality that existed independent of God. If you would have read any of my explanations of how I am using the expression 'possible world', you will have seen that the position I have suggested does not even come close to endorsing the silly ideas that you have used to characterize it.

That said, it is true that Plantinga uses his possible world semantics for modal language in reformulating the ontological argument and (if I recall correctly) in his 'free will defense'. One does not need to be convinced of either of these arguments (or argument and 'defense'), however, in order to employ possible world semantics. (Note: these arguments--his reformulated ontological argument and his 'free will defense' are, I believe, found in the book I mentioned earlier. I, however, have not taken the time to read The Nature of Necessity, but only other works which cover some of the same ground. Either way, I don't want to get sidetracked trying to defend Plantinga. As long as you don't read more into my use of "possible worlds" than I have explicitly said I intend by the expression, then the discussion can remain manageable.)

Incidentally, the use of possible world semantics is simply a part of modal logic today, whether someone accepts Plantinga's, David Lewis', or someone else's metaphysics of possible worlds. Using possible world language, therefore, is now as commonplace as talking about affirming the antecedent, etc. Things get complicated, though. I'm not using possible world talk in a loaded metaphysical sense. (If you want to see what that kind of 'possible world' talk would be, you would have to read up on David Lewis's theory. It is ridiculous. For our purposes, just focus on how I defined the term. It is as simple as that.)


"He that hath light thoughts of sin, never had great thoughts of God." ...John Owen