Pilgrim,

Thanks for the clarification, especially regarding the distinction between the Calvinist shunning of "free-will" and simultaneous acceptance of "freedom of the will". I think your explanation is very clear, and I take it as reliable and consistent with the 5 points of Calvinism, and therefore with the Bible. And I therefore accept your defense of compatibilism as valid and reliable. Even so, Terrence Tiessen apparently has a concern that might be valid. I don't know. According to Boanerges, Tiessen says,

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This is a compatibilist account that affirms both meticulous providence and human freedom of a spontaneous or voluntary kind. This model is less certain than the traditional Calvinist model that God is absolutely timeless because of a concern that such a concept may not do justice to God’s highly relational personal being. In a significant sense, God is not only determining human history, he is responding to his creatures within it. This divine responsiveness is facilitated by God’s knowledge of how creatures would act in particular circumstances (so called ‘middle knowledge’). God not only knows the actual future, he has determined that future. But in order to do this, God needed to know how his creatures would respond to situations, including their response to his own persuasions or actions. God can know this because his creatures are not libertarianly free and he must know this in order to plan how he will act to bring about his purposes. With simple foreknowledge God would know the future but would be unable to do anything about it. With ‘middle knowledge’ God is able to plan and then to accomplish his plan without violating the responsible freedom he has given to his creatures.

By "meticulous providence", I suspect Tiessen means essentially the same thing that Sproul means when he says, "no maverick molecules". When Tiessen says "human freedom", he probably means the same thing as the Calvinist "freedom of the will". When he talks about
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the traditional Calvinist model that God is absolutely timeless because of a concern that such a concept may not do justice to God’s highly relational personal being
, if it's true that traditional Calvinism holds this view of God's timelessness, then I suspect that this may be a legitimate concern. If traditional Calvinism holds to a timeless view of God, then it looks reasonable to me to wonder if this timelessness was imported into Christian theology from Greco-Romans, because it appears to me that the God of the pre-Christian Hebrews was, and is, a "highly relational personal being". I don't doubt that you're right in indicating that Tiessen's "middle knowledge" doesn't do justice to the sovereignty of God. I'm trying to figure out if he has an inadequate solution to a legitimate problem.


A Theological Inventory of American Jurisprudence
"Unjust law is not law." - Augustine (De Lib Arb, i, 5)