Joe,

Some clarity for those reading this thread may be gained by referring to a point of terminology which can cause confusion.

For good or ill, the English term will is able to be used both as

1) the faculty of the heart by which moral choices are made in accord with the nature of the person

and

2) the desire of a person for a particular outcome

In many cases, the two usages can both be true in a particular situation: a person desires something (#2) and his will chooses to fulfill that desire in accordance with the inclination of his heart (#1)

Where we can get into trouble is in describing the situation in which: a person desires something (#2) but is prevented from fulfilling that "will" (#2 still).

The danger is that while we may be correct in saying that his "will" was acted upon--changed, thwarted, manipulated--we are speaking only of the removal of the opportunity to fulfill a desire (#2) and not at all about his "will" as faculty of moral choice (#1).

As one example, take Haman in Esther 6. His "will" (=desire) was to exalt himself over Mordecai, and he exercised his "will" (=moral faculty) in attempting to use the king to bring about that outcome. When the king ordered Mordecai exalted at Haman's expense instead, Haman's "will" (=desire) was indeed thwarted, crushed, overthrown and brought to naught.

BUT .....

even while pronouncing blessing on Mordecai--clearly contrary to his "will" (=desire)--Haman's "will" (=moral faculty) had not been violated AT ALL, because he continued to exercise that faculty to act in full accord with his nature among the new opportunities presented, namely by obeying the king, thus preserving his life and offering further opportunity for revenge against Mordecai. So we could say that while acting contrary to his will (#2) Haman's will (#1) was nevertheless freely dictating his every action.

The many passages--Abimelech has been mentioned--which refer to God overriding a person's will are all instances of providential, sovereign ordering and bounding of the circumstances within which the person's willed desires (#2) could be acted upon, and involve no change of the person's actual faculty of will (#1) itself, which invariably reflects the very nature of the person.

In Christ,
Paul S